Payday Loan Rollovers and Consumer Welfare
Introduction
Payday loans are small-dollar, short-term consumer loans at high interest rates. A typical loan is for $300 for a term of two weeks, with a finance charge of $45-making the effective interest rate 391 percent. Only about five percent of U.S. households utilize payday loans. The average borrower takes out about nine loans in a year (Hecht 2013 ). This intersection of effective tripledigit interest rates and frequency of utilization of payday loans has generated a provocative and expanding discourse regarding the impacts of payday borrowing on consumer welfare.
Use of payday loans is frequently associated with repeated refinancings (so-called "rollovers"), either at or within a few days following the maturity of the initial loan. According to the industry's principal federal regulator, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), a majority-55 percent-of payday borrowers roll over their loans only once or not at all; however, of the remaining borrowers, a substantial number are in debt for protracted periods; that protraction is exacerbated if gaps between loans are disregarded (CFPB 2014).
It is an article of faith among anti-payday advocates that sustained use is harmful to consumers. However, to date, the discourse on sustained use has been premised nearly exclusively on a presumption of harm, due to the absence of an empirical basis for that presumption or of any non-anecdotal evidence of actual detriment. For example, the CFPB produced a "White Paper" addressing in material part the subject of sustained use. The CFPB ultimately opined that "The potential for consumer harm and the data gathered to date are persuasive that further attention is warranted . . ." (CFPB 2013; emphasis added). More recently, however, CFPB (2014) generally avoids normative statements or unsubstantiated conclusions regarding the welfare implications of rollovers.
Such a welfare detriment is an important concept under the CFPB's governing statute, for two reasons. First, a finding of "substantial injury" is necessary in order for a financial practice to be deemed "unfair"-the principal standard by which the CFPB can regulate payday lending.
To qualify as unfair, the injury must not be "outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition." 1 Thus, unfairness-based regulation of sustained-use lending must be premised on a cost-benefit analysis that quantifies the injury to consumers, as well as the benefits. 2 Second, the requirement for such a cost-benefit analysis in the statute is rendered explicit: the CFPB must study "the potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered persons, including the potential reduction of access by consumers to consumer financial products or services resulting from [a payday-rollover-limiting] rule." 3 To date, no academic research (or disclosed research by the CFPB itself) supplies this analysis.
In this study, I seek to contribute to closing this research gap.
As detailed below, important previous empirical studies have focused broadly on: (a)
whether payday loans are generally beneficial or harmful to consumers; (b) identifying usage patterns of loans, including rollovers; and (c) ascertaining consumers' understanding of, satisfaction with and cognitive biases with respect to payday loans.
This study builds on previous work, principally of Kaufman (2013) (who studies patterns of loan usage under different state regulatory schemes), Bhutta (2013) and Bhutta, Skiba and To-1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1031(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a). 2 The CFPB may also regulate payday-lending practices that it finds to be "abusive." Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d). This standard focuses primarily on consumer understanding, behavioral and disclosure concepts that are beyond the scope of this paper. 3 Dodd-Frank Act § 1022(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b) (2) .
bacman (2012) (who study outcomes from payday-loan usage using credit scores as a welfare proxy).
I examine the welfare effects of longer "sequence" lengths of sustained borrowing. 4 In addition, by exploiting interstate differences in rollover regulation, I examine the welfare effects of state-law limitations on rollovers.
These effects are measured primarily using credit scores as an outcome variable, a technique introduced by Bhutta (2013) . Credit scores have limitations with low-income populations, and these limitations are addressed in this study. Nevertheless, for reasons discussed below, credit scores are an extremely useful proxy for overall consumer financial health.
I find that longer-term borrowers have better outcomes (measured by changes in credit scores) than consumers whose borrowing is limited to shorter durations. I also find that, although state regulation has a small effect on longer-term usage patterns, payday borrowers in lessrestrictive states (i.e., those which permit many or unlimited rollovers) generally have better outcomes than those in more restrictive states, in each case controlling for the borrowers' initial financial condition.
Specifically, using a combination of a general estimating equation model and distributional analysis, I find that sustained use of payday loans has a net positive impact on consumer credit scores, and that state-law restrictions on the duration of payday-loan borrowing have a net negative impact. These results add to a growing body of research which has found that restricting 4 CFPB (2014) introduces the term "loan sequence," which it defines as "a series of loans taken out within 14 days of repayment of a prior loan." Prior work by Fusaro and Cirillo (2011) and Mann (2013) employs similar concepts. For purposes of this paper, I consider loans to be part of a "sequence" if re-borrowing occurs within two days of repayment of a prior loan. As discussed below, changes in this definition do not materially affect the principal conclusions of this paper, and the findings of this study are robust to the same definition used in CFPB (2014) and Mann (2013) (re-borrowing occurs within 14 days of repayment of the prior loan). access to payday credit, whether generally or at refinancing, has negative consumer-welfare consequences.
These findings run counter to established notions of presumed harm from sustained use, and they therefore raise significant policy questions for the CFPB and state regulators. These findings suggest the appropriateness of further study of actual consumer outcomes before the imposition of incremental regulation at the federal or state level.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 surveys current literature on payday lending, with emphasis on rollovers; Section 3 provides an overview of the data used in the study; Section 4 presents analytical results and implications; and Section 5 concludes.
Payday Lending Literature
Previous studies of the welfare impacts of payday lending in general are characterized by (a) ambiguity, and (b) small effects. Because controlled trials of payday-loan use have proven difficult to conduct, these studies are observational and use a variety of proxies for welfare outcomes (e.g., bankruptcies, crime, mortgage foreclosures, bank account closures, NSF checks, self-reported financial security, complaints against lenders and credit scores).
As an example of the ambiguities in these studies, Morgan and Strain (2008) find that access to payday loans results in decreases in chapter 7 bankruptcy filings. Skiba and Tobacman (2011) find that access to payday loans increases chapter 13 filings but has no effect on chapter 7
filings and no effect overall on all forms of bankruptcy combined. Maloney and Stoianovici (2008) find no relationship between access to payday loans and any kind of bankruptcy filings. Bhutta (2013) found evidence that access to payday loans reduces the incidence of accounts in collection. Zinman (2012) found, in the wake of a rate ceiling that effectively banned payday loans in Oregon, surveyed respondents in that state were more likely to report deterioration in self-assessed welfare than respondents in a neighboring control state. Desai and Elliehausen (2013) found that, following payday loan bans, consumers experienced an increase in delinquencies of other credit products.
Bhutta, Skiba and Tobacman (2013) also used a welfare proxy similar to that employed in this study: Equifax consumer credit scores. They found scores were effectively the same for applicants approved and those barely rejected for payday loans. Specifically, they found that payday loan access appears irrelevant to credit improvement or deterioration.
Useful discussions of the ambiguities and remaining gaps in understanding these effects can be found in Shapiro (2011) and Caskey (2010) (". . . despite the research efforts of a talented group of economists, we still don't know the answer to the big question: [d] o payday lenders, on net, exacerbate or relieve customers' financial difficulties?"). The details of the manifold approaches surveyed by these scholars will not be reiterated here.
To a large extent, in the absence of an answer to Caskey's "big question," public discourse on payday lending has moved on to the more discrete question of whether and how to regulate sustained use. Implicit in this narrowing of focus are assumptions that the CFPB cannot regulate the price of credit 5 and that low-and middle-income consumers should not have their access to short-term credit entirely cut off. However, the CFPB has made clear that sustained use is a source of "potential" harm for which regulatory interventions should be considered. As noted previously, this theory of harm is not evidence-based.
Opponents of payday lending hypothesize that payday loans lead to a cycle of repeat borrowing. See, e.g., Center for Responsible Lending (2009). Their assumption is that repeat bor-rowing is unintended by the borrower and the result of the very high interest rates on the loan. This is essentially a mathematical or mechanical theory: when a constrained borrower's limited funds are devoted to payment of relatively large amounts of interest, few resources will remain to reduce principal, and the borrower will be forced to roll over his loan. Thus, they argue, the borrower is "trapped" in a "cycle of debt." 6 Alternatively, opponents argue that borrowers suffer from a cognitive bias-undue optimism-that causes them to overestimate their ability to repay their loans promptly. Bar-Gill and Warren (2008) . Under this theory, borrowers chronically underestimate or ignore multiple demands on their incoming cash flows and fall short at payday, necessitating re-borrowing. This is a pure behavioral theory.
Fusaro and Cirillo (2011) challenged the mathematical theory. They designed a controlled field experiment to test the notion that payday borrowers are forced to devote so much of their free cash flow to interest that they are unable to repay principal-i.e., that high interest rates result in repeat borrowing. They found that when borrowers were provided with interest-free loans, there was no significant effect on rollover behavior.
Mann (2013) challenged the behavioral theory in another experiment. He surveyed borrowers at the inception of their loan "sequence" and asked them to predict their actual repayment performance. Mann found that most payday loan borrowers had never expected to be debt-free at the end of the first loan term; to the contrary, they had expected ex ante to roll over their loans for additional terms after the original maturity date. Specifically, borrowers predicted that they would be debt-free in a median of 36 days. In addition, 60 percent of borrowers were able to pre-dict their debt-free date to within 14 days (Mann 2013 ). These findings directly contradict the criticism that extended use of payday loans is the product of lender misrepresentation or borrower self-deception about when the loan will be repaid. Kaufman (2013) found that interstate regulatory variation permitted him to challenge the view that payday lending was a "monolithic entity"; he found that, in practice, payday lending was an assortment of products which have been shaped by varying state laws. These variations have created widely differing experiences for consumers. Kaufman reports on actual usage patterns in light of state laws designed to limit repeat borrowing or excessive or hidden charges to borrowers.
Goldin and Homonoff (2013) find that, while payday lending activity decreases following stricter regulation, the reduction is offset by an increase in borrowing from arguably inferior substitute credit sources. They also document that payday-loan bans are associated with an increase in involuntary closures of consumer checking accounts-a pattern which suggests that consumers may substitute payday borrowing instruments with other forms of high-interest credit, such as bank overdrafts and bounced checks.
Data
Three large payday lenders provided electronic borrower histories for a total of 37,655 randomly selected individual borrowers who incurred "new" payday loans from storefront out- The lenders who submitted data for use in the study are all members of Community Financial Services Association of America (CFSA), a trade association of storefront lenders. CFSA members subscribe to a self-regulatory set of "Best Practices," which include certain voluntarily assumed limitations on rollovers and which require certain troubled debtors upon request to be offered extended repayment options at low or no cost. 8 Compliance with these practices likely results in observed consumer rollover behavior and creditworthiness in this study differing somewhat from that of the general marketplace.
The data fields appended by Trans Union included hundreds of credit attributes commonly found in a consumer credit file (e.g., number of trade lines, highest balance on revolving trades, highest ever collection balance, etc.). These credit attributes also included individual credit scores. These scores were used as the principal outcome variable in this study because they are a general proxy for overall financial health.
The credit score used here is the VantageScore ® . This is a proprietary score developed by the three major credit bureaus (Trans Union, Equifax and Experian) to identify loan applicants likely to become 90 or more days delinquent within a 24-month period. The VantageScore ranges from a low of 501 to a high of 990. The score is an index of an individual's overall financial health and is based on multiple general factors regarding a consumer's credit-related behavior, including delinquencies, line utilization, balances, depth of credit, recent credit and available credit. Because delinquencies and payment history contribute to about 35% of one's credit score, the score becomes a proxy for an individual's ability to manage payments and avoid delinquencies. Consequently, if a borrower is experiencing difficulty meeting financial obligations, the credit score would be expected to reflect this difficulty. Thus, credit scores are a valuable tool for measuring, and generally an accurate reflection of, overall financial health. Such scores are particularly valuable in the context of this study because payday loans are generally not reported to the large national credit reporting agencies; thus the outcome variable is independent of the treatment variable. Because payday-loan activity is not factored in the calculation of the credit score, any correlation between payday-loan activity and credit-score dynamics lacks a direct causal relationship. One advantage of specifically using the VantageScore over the mainstream FICO ® score is that the VantageScore may provide more accurate reflections of consumers with subprime, new or "thin" credit histories. For example, where a FICO score requires at least six months of history, the VantageScore is calculated with as little as one month of history. In addition, the VantageScore minimizes the scoring impact of loans less than $250. 9 , 10 Nevertheless, credit scores have certain limitations in this context. While credit scores may be useful as a broad measure to discriminate between classes of borrowers (e.g., "subprime"
and "superprime"), the value of such scores as a proxy for overall financial health may be attenuated if the changes in scores are small. Only substantial changes in credit score are likely to have a material impact on any given individual's welfare.
Where recent research on payday lending activity has included analysis of the impact of regulatory differences on payday loan usage (e.g., Kaufman, 2013) or on consumer credit attributes (e.g., Desai and Elliehausen, 2013), the current study integrates payday borrowing activity with credit attributes and scores for the same borrowers-allowing for a unique contribution to the growing body of research regarding impacts of regulation and sustained usage of payday lending on consumer financial welfare, the proxy for which in this study is changes in VantageScore.
Results
This study seeks to join this growing body of data-driven research addressing hypotheses that payday borrowing negatively impacts borrower welfare. This study operationalizes "welfare" as change in the borrower's VantageScore following payday borrowing. I focus on changes in scores as a principal outcome; I study how such changes are impacted by differences in rollo- 9 See http://www.vantagescore.com/scores-more-people.
ver behavior, irrespective of regulatory environment, and how such changes are impacted by state rollover regulation, in each case over two different time periods. 12 Given the continuum of rollover regulations by state, a binary indicator of "restrictive" or "non-restrictive" for each state was not feasible and would not have been meaningful. Therefore, the interstate analysis in the current study compares results from Texas, a largely unregulated control environment, with the other states across the regulation continuum, as the treatment environments, in an attempt to evaluate the impacts of differences in regulation. 11 Utah limits the aggregate term of borrowing to ten weeks. Assuming a loan term of two weeks, this is the equivalent of one original loan plus four rollovers. While California prohibits "rollovers," it allows same-day transactions which may have some economic equivalence to rollovers. Missouri has a limitation of a loan renewal up to six times, with a 5% reduction in principal with each rollover. The remaining states (except Texas) have various explicit bans on rollovers. Two states in the sample-Florida and Oklahoma-enforce their rollover restrictions by requiring lenders to report to and query a statewide borrower database. 12 See http://www.sos.state.tx.us/statdoc/faqs2800. and it is unclear to what extent, if any, Bhutta's subjects borrowed from CFSA member lenders who may subscribe to the self-regulatory practices described above. Table 3 provides payday borrowing activity by state, including average rollovers per bor-
rower. An immediate observation is that states in Table 1 with strict rollover restrictions (e.g., Florida, Kansas and Oklahoma) actually have a substantial count of payday loans deemed to be rolled over.
This observation raises two issues. The first is related to the definition of a "rollover."
"Rollover" is a term with no fixed or uniform definition. Recognizing this lack of a common definition, Fusaro and Cirillo (2011) "somewhat arbitrarily" defined a "spell" to include all new loan transactions undertaken within 30 days of maturity of the previous loan. Mann (2013) defined an economic "rollover" as loans with 14 days between maturity date and next origination.
CFPB (2014) introduces the concept of "sequences"; similar to Mann's approach, a loan is considered a continuation of previous credit when it is undertaken within 14 days of the prior loan's due date.
In the current study, I have elected to use a definition of rollover that comports with more traditional notions of "nearly same-day" refinancing. For the data used in this study, it is difficult to distinguish "same day" loans (a new loan taken out on the same day) from a loan rolled over (a continuation of an existing loan). Lenders record rollovers as two separate loans, instead of one loan with a continuation. In addition, while some states proscribe same-day refinancings (e.g., Florida, which has a one-day "cooling-off" period between successive loans), consumers frequently appear to arrange their affairs to consummate the new loan one day later. Therefore, in the present study, an economic "rollover" exists when there were fewer than two days between the date an existing loan was paid and the origination date of a new loan to the same borrower with the same lender. In other words, I deem a rollover to exist if the borrower was debt-free for less than two days between loans.
I posit that this "tight" definition of a rollover will isolate the "purest" group of serial users; an individual who rolls over a loan within 48 hours of the maturity date would likely consider the debt to be a continuation of the same loan. While this approach may capture fewer overall transactions, it will more precisely capture and characterize the activity of those borrowers who did not retire their debt on the designated maturity date-either by choice (Mann [2013] determined that most borrowers who roll over a loan fall into this category) or by circumstance, including those borrowers experiencing an unexpected financial shock (e.g., a natural disaster or medical emergency) in a way that a longer-period definition may not. In addition, individuals residing in states with restrictions on rollovers (see Table 1 ) are those borrowers who must contribute additional effort to arrange their affairs to consummate the new loan, providing at least anecdotal evidence of organized intent to continue the loan after maturity. I find that 55% of borrowers who rolled over a loan within 14 days did so within two days; and 95% did so within seven days. Therefore, a tightened definition of rollover at two days still encompasses over half of all borrowers rolling over their loans. As will be presented below, the results of this study are robust to different definitions of "rollover." 13 13 One effect of this tighter definition is that the reported number of loans rolled over in Table 3 , for example, is lower than would be reported under a longer period, although the relative distribution among states is approximately the same. A secondary analysis of the main mod-The second issue is related to the existence central databases. Two of the states in the present study-Florida and Oklahoma-require payday lenders to report payday loans to a central database. The result is that information about outstanding indebtedness is common, rather than lender-specific. Proponents of databases contend that without a database, a borrower could borrow from multiple lenders simultaneously. In Table 3 it is shown that Florida and Oklahoma, the states in this study with required databases, have slightly lower average counts of loans "rolled over" (less than two days between loans) per borrower relative to the other states included in the study. However, these values are still quite high-2.5 and 2.6 rollovers per borrower, respectively, considering the relatively tight rollover restrictions combined with the presence of central databases. Utah, for example, has a rollover rate of 2.9 per borrower, just slightly in excess of the rates for Florida and for Oklahoma; Utah has relatively non-binding rollover restrictions and no central database. Table 4 provides statistics for the number of payday loans utilized until borrowers are debt-free for 14 or more days (similar to the definition used by Mann, 2013 and CFPB, 2014).
The overall mean number of payday loans required before debt-free status is 4.6, with a median of 2. Florida, which most heavily restricts payday loan access, has a mean of 4.5 loans-slightly under the national average. Although Texas, with few restrictions on payday lending, has an average of 5.4, Utah, which has relatively fewer restrictions on rollovers, is lower than Florida, with an average of 3.4 payday loans required until the borrower is debt-free. I thus find, consistently with Kaufman (2013) , that differences in interstate rollover regulation appear to have only a small effect on longer-term usage patterns.
eling results is provided in Appendix B and also demonstrates no substantive differences in outcomes. Table 5 shows that the overall average credit score decreased for these payday borrowers In an effort to capture and explain the variation in changes in credit scores, changes were categorized into ten deciles ranging from a decrease in credit score of more than 20 percent to an increase of greater than 0 percent. Through examining percentage change as an outcome variable, the approach controls for differences in starting score.
To that end, Table 6 demonstrates two important points. First, the majority of payday borrowers in the study typically experienced relatively small decreases, or even increases, in their credit scores. This is evidenced by the relatively large percentage of borrowers in the -2. whole, continued to have access to payday loans, possibly preventing a further decrease in their overall welfare. This point will be developed in greater detail below.
Across the same segments of changes in credit score introduced in Tables 6, there is Table 7 , and then for 2008-2009 in Table 8 , provide support the conclusion that borrowers experience a net positive welfare impact when they face fewer restrictions on rollovers. From Table 7 , the overall predictive accuracy of the model was found to be .65. Any estimate with a negative value indicates that the factor contrib- Table 8 ). It is also worth noting that, with the exception of Oklahoma, "state" was a stronger predictor of credit score increase or decrease than an individual's bankruptcies or revolving bankcard balances.
15 Table 8 provides the model information for the same factors contributing to a change in credit score from 2008 to 2009. As referenced above, the climate for consumer credit was substantively different than for the period previous and was characterized by a more restrictive credit market. This difference is manifested in several ways. For example, from Table 9 Given the findings from the models that regulatory environment, operationalized as state, appears to be a significant contributor to change in credit score for payday borrowers, I chose to isolate this predictor, to examine further the distribution of credit score changes within these states, using the logic developed in Table 6 . Specifically, if state regulatory environment plays no role in a borrower's change in credit scores, and has somehow been inflated in the context of a multivariate model presented in Tables 7 and 8 , then it would be expected that each state would have approximately the same distribution within each decile of change in credit score, ceteris paribus.
For example, from Table 10 , California represents 14.7 percent of the total customers in the dataset from 2006-2007. It would, therefore, be expected that California would comprise approximately this percentage in all of the ten segments of change in credit scores. However, California, a state which at least nominally limits payday rollovers, is substantively over-represented 17 There were a total of 15,021 borrowers for whom there were no missing observations and who could be evaluated in a GEE for the 2006 to 2009 period. While the coefficients varied slightly from the two individual period models reported, neither the relative nor the absolute significance changed.
in the worst-performing segments (e.g., < 20 percent decrease, 20 percent to 17.5 percent decrease), while Texas, the "control" state, is substantively under-represented in the same segments (again, recall from Table 9 that Texas borrowers started 2006 with a higher proportion of debt 90+ days delinquent). Specifically, California is over-indexed in the worst performing segment at a rate of 1.3, while Texas is under-indexed at 0.8. 20 See Table 11 .
Conclusions
Critics of payday lending contend that sustained use adversely affects borrower welfare.
This criticism has led to a series of state-level regulatory responses restricting such longer-term use of payday loans. Again, these interventions are premised on the presumed, but undemonstrated, harm arising from sustained use.
This study contributes to a growing body of literature which shows that payday loans may not only fail to contribute negatively to borrower welfare, but may actually contribute to an improvement in borrower welfare, measured here as an increase in overall credit scores.
Specifically, the results of this study make two important contributions:
18 Index = actual percentage/expected percentage.
The first contribution is related to sustained use of payday loans. Within the general estimating equations, the total number of payday loan rollovers was found to be strongly positively related to changes in credit score. In addition, the total number of rollovers was higher for borrowers who experienced increases in their credit score and lower for borrowers who experienced decreases in their credit scores. These results provide evidence for the proposition that borrowers who face fewer restrictions on sustained use have better financial welfare outcomes, defined as increases in credit scores. Importantly, not only did sustained usage not contribute to a negative outcome, it contributed to a positive outcome for borrowers. Because credit scores are heavily comprised of payment history and delinquencies, if a borrower were experiencing difficulty making payments, we would expect to see a decrease in credit scores (or at least no change in credit scores) for heavy payday loan borrowers. However, the opposite effect was found. In a larger sense, these findings are consistent with those of Zinman (2010) There are other exogenous economic factors which could impact changes in credit scores.
For example, interest rates and some other loan terms vary among the states selected, although these differences are unlikely to be of much moment. Moreover, there are interstate differences in consumer financial status that arise from local economic conditions unobserved in this study.
However, the results related to regulatory context cannot simply be dismissed as a function of unexamined economic factors. This is true for two reasons. First, regulation in the most restrictive states was enacted specifically create the opposite effect-to improve consumers' welfare by limiting rollovers. The evidence was precisely to the contrary: state of borrowing was found to be a stronger predictor of changes in credit scores than were bankruptcy or revolving balances on bank cards. The second reason is that Texas, the state examined in this study with the least restrictive regulatory environment for payday borrowing and the highest rate of rollover activity, actually had the highest percent of balances 90+ days delinquent in 2006-the beginning period for this study-and yet borrowers in this state experienced smallest least decreases in credit scores over the four-year period studied.
This study has important policy implications for the CFPB and state regulators. While previous research has largely focused on mean outcomes from payday loan usage, this is the first to look at the distribution of outcomes at the individual level and to attempt to relate that distribution to variations in sustained-use patterns. Despite several years of finger-pointing by interest groups, it is fairly clear that, whatever the "culprit" is in producing adverse outcomes for payday borrowers, it is almost certainly something other than rollovers-and apparently some as yet unstudied alternative factor. Additional investigation is necessary to tease out the causes of this distribution.
Premature new proscriptions on rollovers may not only deprive borrowers of a useful and welfare-enhancing source of continued credit when needed, but it may also mask the true causes of detriment to those borrowers who do not benefit from payday credit. Tables   Table 1 *Auto Loans and Revolving Balances on Credit Cards were selected over mortgages or HELOCS with the intention of using loan types which were more common to the subprime and alternatively banked segments. Tables 3, 6 and 7 as well as in Figure 2 . 
